“Patterns of thinking are not, for Marx, merely bound up with social relations but form an essential part of what, in a given instance, “society” is. In order to follow through this line of thought, we may turn from Marx's thesis of a distinction between theory and practice to his thesis that theory and practice form a unity.
Marx urges the thesis of a unity of theory and practice by affirming both the necessity of theory to practice and the necessity of practice to theory. The necessity of theory to practice is implied in his 1844 view of revolutionary practice as involving a unity of philosophy and the proletariat and his 1845 view of revolutionary practice as ‘“practical-critical” activity' (CW, 3, p 187; 5, p. 3).8 It is implied also in his characterisation of human as opposed to animal production both in the 1844 Manuscripts – 'Man makes his life activity the object of his will and consciousness. He has conscious life activity' (CW, 3, p. 276) – and in Capital.9 The necessity of practice to theory, on the other hand, is affirmed directly: 'Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious being, and the being of man is their natural life-process' (CW, 5, p. 36). The necessity of practice to theory is likewise implied when Marx tells us that 'scientific' activity is 'social' activity (CW, 3, p. 298) and also that 'All social life is essentially practical' ('Theses on Feuerbach', VIII: CW, 5, p. 5). For Marx, neither thoughts nor language form a 'realm of their own' but are, rather, 'only manifestations of actual life' (CW, 5, p. 447).10 But, if theory and practice are thus mutually necessary and so form a unity, it remains to determine what form this unity has and how it is to be understood.
An answer to this question is suggested by two further passages. In one, Marx rejects the view – its exponents are unspecified – which 'does not include philosophy in the circle of German reality' (CW, 3, p. 180). In the other, he urges his point in the form of a rhetorical question: ‘“Can the [Young Hegelian] critic live in the society he criticises?” It should be asked instead: must he not live in that society? Must he not be a manifestation of the life of that society?' (CW, 4, p. 160). In short, theory is socially real – it is located in society – but at the same time 'All social life is essentially practical' (CW, 5, p. 5). Thus it can be suggested that the best way to characterise Marx's view of the distinction between, and unity of, theory and practice is to say that, for him, theory is a real and necessary moment (or aspect) of society as a totality (or whole). Thus practice is theory-inclusive just as theory, for its part, is practice-relatedand subsists only on a practical terrain. Just such a view of theory as a moment of practice is expressed in the already-quoted phrase ‘“practical-critical” activity', 'critical' being understood here as indicating the theoretical moment in practice, or 'activity', taken as a theory-inclusive whole. Seen in this way, theory is neither external to practice (a 'realm' of its own: CW, 5. p. 447; cf. 'Theses on Feuerbach', IV) nor yet – as in Marx's view it was for the Young Hegelians – the sole and true form of practice, nor yet again something socially and practically in essential or unreal. Theory is distinct from practice in that it forms a moment (rather than the whole) of practice: there are things practice can do – e.g. 'changing the world' – which theory on its own cannot. And theory is in unity with practice since that of which it is a moment is a practical whole.
Thus the theses of the distinction between and unity of theory and practice – which at first sight might seem mutually exclusive – elegantly and lucidly combine. Moreover, the view of theory as a moment in, and of, practice provides clarification of the sense in which the destruction even for oneself of an ideological practice may be accomplished only in social and practical terms.”
- Richard Gunn